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This paper analyzes the excess liquidity especially on banking industry and its impact on monetary
policy in Indonesia. We firstly investigate the determinants of bank behavior on their favor for excess
liquidity both for precautionary motive and involuntary. Furthermore we determine the threshold between
the low and high excess liquidity regimes. On the next step, this paper evaluates and compares the impact
of excess liquidity on monetary policy between the two regimes. The first result shows that the excess
liquidity on bank with their precautionary motive is significantly determined by the volatility of money
demand, the volatility of economic growth, the bank cost of the bank, and also by the lag of excess
liquidity, which conform its persistence. Secondly, using the Threshold-VAR approach, this paper shows
the switching regime occurs in 2005 from low to high excess liquidity. Lastly, the excess liquidity reduces
the effectiveness of monetary policy on controlling inflation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Excess liquidity in Indonesian banking started since economic crisis 1997. At that time,
the worsen condition of national banking due to the high non-performing credit and the decline
in public confidence urged the government to provide liquidity supportfor the troubled banks.
The aim was to rescue the entire banking system. However, since the government fund was not
sufficient, in 1998 Bank Indonesia provided bailout fund, known as Bank Indonesia Liquidity
Support (BLBI), by Rp 144.5 trillion. Other programsto save the banking system was banking
restructuring and recapitalization program. For the latter program, government issued bond
for capital participation in 24 banks, to help them meet the capital requirements ruled by Bank
Indonesia. These two programs; BLBI and banking recapitalization program, started the era of
soaring and persistent excess liquidity in national banking system, until now.
Along with the economic development, the persistency of excess liquidity often creates
problems for the central bank and for the economy in general. Excess liquidity can reduce the
effectiveness of monetary policy transmission mechanism, especially in affecting demand side
to reachthe targeted inflation. In addition, the excess liquidity in banking system will push the
central bank to absorb it through monetary operation in forms of SBI auction (Certificate of
Bank Indonesia), Fasbi, and FTK, to eliminate its pressure on financial market.
Nevertheless, when the excess liquidity is very large and persistent, it gives pressure to
the sustainability of central bank»s balance because central bank should pay interest for banking
fund placement in SBI, Fasbi, or FTK. Noted to October 2010, excess liquidity absorbed through
Open Market Operation (OMO) reached Rp 381 trillion.
On the other hand, from the bank perspective, the excess liquidity raise the risk of real
sector and make them reluctant to distribute their fund to productive loan, and choose to place
Figure 1.1.
Excess Liquidity Absorption via Open Market Operation
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it in monetary instrument. Consequently, the fund for the real sector is limited and even if it is
available, the price would be higher.
However, not all excess liquidity portions negativelyaffect the effectiveness of monetary
policy transmission mechanism. In certain portion, excess liquidity is useful as a buffer for banking
towards the uncertainty of fund withdrawal by customer and exchange rate volatility, influence
the banking capital. Within this necessaryportion, excess liquidity is called precautionary excess
liquidity. The remaining excess liquidity is unnecessary and is potential to give negative impacts
for effectiveness of monetary policy. This remaining excess liquidity is called involuntary excess
liquidity.
Therefore, it is necessary to determine the magnitude of precautionary and involuntary
excess liquidity. By having this knowledge, authority monetary can determine how much excess
liquidity to absorb through open market operations (OMO).
Empirical research on excess liquidity and its consequences toward the effectiveness of
monetary policy are widely available. Saxegaard (2006)2is one of the most cited references.
Saxegaard underline the necessity to quantify how much excess liquidity needed by banking
for precautionary purpose. Using the sample of African countries in Sahara, he found that
significant amount of involuntary excess liquidity reducedthe effectiveness of monetary policy
transmission in controlling inflation. The reason is better aggregate demand increase the lending
rapidly, and then increases the risk of inflation pressure.
Absorbing excess liquidity through OMO is expensive for the central bank. On the other
hand, during cyclical downturn condition, stimulating aggregate demand would be ineffective
since banking cannot put this unproductive excess liquidity in the form of lending or treasury
bills.
Following Saxegaard method(2006), this paper will (i) calculateprecautionary and
involuntary excess using banking excess liquidity model; (ii) estimate regime-switching models
of monetary policy transmission mechanism, using threshold-VAR to determine the regime
period of high and low precautionary excess liquidity.In general, the objectives of this research
areto acknowledge the impact of excess liquidity persistency on monetary policy
effectiveness; and to give policy recommendation toward excess liquidity persistency
condition.
The second session of this paper covers theories and literature studies. The third session
covers methodology and data, while the fourth session analyzes the result and analysis.
Conclusion will be given in the last session part and close the presentation.
2 Magnus Saxegaard, IMF Working Paper, WP/06/115: Excess Liquidity and Effectiveness of Monetary Policy: Evidence from Sub-
Saharan Africa.
248 Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking,  January 2012
R + L = D
II. THEORY
Excess liquidity is the bankΩreserves deposited in central bank, plus cash for daily operational
needs (cash in vaults), minus minimum reserve requirement, (Saxegaard, 2006). In this context,
excess liquidity is used by banks as a precautionary, and representing the bank optimization
behavior.
The sources of precautionary excess liquidity can be varied. Crisis with high uncertainty
and high default risk can be one of them, where banking tends to keep non-remunerated
liquid assets as precautionarystrategy (Agenor et.al, 2004). Another source of excess liquidity is
institutional factor, where under developed interbank money market (IBM) will stimulate bank
to increase liquidity for precautionary, since they often find it hard to borrow in emergency
situation. Two other sources of excess liquidity are the difficulty on watching their minimum
reserve requirement position; therefore the banks will hold reserves above the level set, and
also the problems in payment system.
Not all excess liquidity arises from bank precautionary behavior. In a certain condition,
excess liquidity owned by banks is neither precautionary nor involuntary. In this involuntary
context, non-remunerated reserves owned by banks do receive return to balance the opportunity
cost when it is held by banks.
Banks prefer holding excess liquidity than giving loan or buy government obligation,
especially in a long run. The reason is the economic condition is in liquidity trap. Liquidity trap
is a condition where return from banking credit is too small to cover intermediation cost and
banks get higher yield in reserves than giving loans. In this condition, expansive monetary
policy will only cause increase in excess reserves.
Agenor et.al. (2000) developed theoretical model of excess liquid reserves demandby
commercial banks, where liquidity and volatility risks of real sector exist. To manage both of
these risks, and to determine the amount liquid assets to hold, commercial banks can get fund
from interbank money market or from the central bank.
There is one representative commercial bank that collect exogenous fund from third
parties (Deposit, D). The bank has to determine the amount of non-interest-bearing liquid asset
(reserve, R) and the amount of interest-bearing non-liquid asset (in credit form, L). The balance
sheet for this commercial bank is:
(1)
Reserve is needed by banks because liquidity risk exists. A net flow of third parties is
random based on density function; Φ  =  Φ’. When net outflow from third-party funds (TPF)
exceed reserves owned by the banks, u > R, banks have to bear illiquidity cost,proportional to
reserve shortage, max (0, u - R). In illiquid condition, banks have to borrow reserve with penalty
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rate (q), which is higher that the loan rate, q > rL. Defining  rD  as a deposit rate, the banks
profit can be formulated as:
(2)
By assumption, loan demand is negatively influenced by interest rates and is proportional
to  expected output ( Y e ). Similarly, TPF is proportional to expected output, but positively
influenced by deposit interest rates:
(3)
(4)
So the expected profit from the bank is:
(5)
It is also assumed that economic agents determine L and D in the beginning of the
period, before a shock in the output. Moreover, there is also demand for cash determined in
the end of the period, after a shock in output and liquidity. Banks have to maintain liquid
reserve, at certain proportion of third-party fund they owned, with interest rate r. Defining θ  as
reserve requirement rate and R as total reserve, the excess reserve, Z, is:
(6)
The balance condition of money market is :
(7)
where C is currency holding; k > 0 is constant reciprocal of velocity; while Y is the realized
output.
This model also assumes that demand on cash is proportional to realized output.
Specifically, the assumption is as follows :
(8)
Where c  =  C / D. Output and  c. k /(1 + c)  is assumed as random based on the following
equation :
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Where ε and  ξ  are random shocks.
By applying equations (8) and (9), a demand on cash is formulated as :
To fulfill the needs of unanticipated demands for cash, banks can borrow cash followed by
interest by q, and take some of the excess reserve (Z). By using equation (6), the expected
reserve deficiency is :
Based on equation (11), (4), (5), and (7), we can get the equation for expected profit
from banks as follows :
By assumption, the functions  and  are quasi-concave functions. We can prove the following
prepositions (the complete proofs can be seen on Agenor et. al, 2000).
1. The increase of penalty rate (q) will increase the deposit interest rates, credit interest rates
and excess reserve owned by banks.
2. The increase of output»s volatility and liquidity shock causes ambiguous effects to deposit
interest rates,»loan»interest rates, and excess reserve. If the initial level of penalty rate is
pretty high, the increase of this volatility will also rise up the deposit interest rates, loan
interest rates, and excess reserve.
3. The increase of reserve requirement rate will increase the credit interest rates and decrease
excess reserve. If the level of volatility is not too high, an increase of reserve requirement
rate will increase the deposit interest rates.
Based on the three prepositions above, if the level of penalty rate is high, there will be
interrelationship among excess reserve (z), penalty rate (q), reserve requirement rate (θ), and
output»s volatility and liquidity shock ( σ ) as follows :
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By sorting excess liquidity into the precautionary and the involuntary, we have deeper
understandings about their impact on the monetary policy transmission mechanism. On
inflationary contexts, involuntary excess liquidity will be released promptly when the
aggregate demand side grows stronger. Therefore, the total liquidity in economy will
increase rapidly without involving policy rate reduction mechanism (loosen monetary
policy), just when the liquidity should be restricted. This triggers the risk of inflation
pressure.
Furthermore, when banking has involuntary excess liquidity due to the problem in
distributing loan, an effort to increase the demand by decreasing the lending cost would be
ineffective. The expansive monetary policy will only increase the excess reserve in banks and
not the loan expansion. In contrast, if tight monetary policies are chosen, banks will reduce
their unwanted reserve. O»Connell (2005)3 states that :
≈ When there is involuntary excess liquidity in the economy in equilibrium, the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy, which usually runs from a tightening or loosening of liquidity
conditions to changes in interest rates or asset demands and then to economic activity, is altered
and possibly interrupted completely. º.∆
On the other hand, monetary policy is expected to be more effective if banks have
the precautionary liquidity access. For example, when monetary policy is loosening by
decreasing minimum reserve requirement, bank liquidity will rise; hence will increase the
allocation for loanwith lower interest rate. On the other hand, when the central bank
choosestight monetary policy, banking will reduce their loans to maintain the level of
expected excess reserve.
Based on the descriptions above, the analysis on the effects of excess liquidity to monetary
policy transmission mechanism requires better understanding on how consistent the policy on
reserve requirement is, on driving the excess reserve demand of bank. Moreover, the
understanding on the sources of excess liquidity is important to decide what policy should be
taken.
There have been a lot of researches about excess liquidity in Indonesia. They focus on
different views about source and impact of the excess liquidity. Some of the researches are
summarized in the table below.
3 Stephen O»Connell, 2005, ≈A Floor and Ceiling Model of U.S. Output,∆ Journal of Economics Dynamic and Control, Vol. 21, pp.
661-95.
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III.  METHODOLOGY
3.1.  Estimation of Precautionary and Involuntary Excess Reserve
Following Henry et.al. (2010), who use theoretical model of Agenor et.al. (2000), we
estimate the precautionary excess reserve with the following empirical model:
Table 1.
Literatures on Excess Liquidity
Authors Year Analysis  Method Result
Mochtar &
Kolopaking
Saxegaard
Prastowo &
Prasmuko
Widayat, et.
al
2010
2006
2008
2005
Regression
Regression,
Threshold VAR
Qualitative
Qualitative,
Accounting
- The strategy of foreign exchange reserves accumulation
could disturb the effectiveness of monetary policy since
there will be liquidity expansion by the central bank without
any mechanism on the influences of interest rates.
Some of the negative impacts for the action are:
- The efforts in controlling inflation are not optimal.
- The increasing of exchange value potency as a shock
amplifier.
- There is a disturbance in the interaction between fiscal
and monetary policies.
A persistent high excess liquidity will weaken the monetary
policy transmission mechanism; hence reduce the capability
of central bank to influence demands in economy.
There is a large substitutive correlation between the
decrease of SBI (Bank Indonesia Certificate) and the
delivery of credits in Indonesian banking.
The liquidity of banking depends mostly on the sale of SBI
(Certificate of Bank Indonesia).
The volatility of inter-bank interest rates, PUAB) depends
on the high excess liquidity, both short-termand relatively
permanent one (long term).
The discretionary monetary policy createsuncertainty in
prices and the banking liquidity placement.
(14)
Where EL  is Excess liquidity; CV
c/d  is Cash/Deposit volatility; D  is Deposit; CVY/Yt  is Output
gap volatility; RR  is Reserve requirement; Y/Yt  is Output gap; and r  is Penalty rate.
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We use Certificate of Bank of Indonesia (SBI) owned by bank as the proxy for excess
liquidity. This is in line with Prastowo and Prasmoko (2008), which argue that banks prefer to
put their excess liquidity in the form of SBI rather than in giral account in Bank Indonesia. We
use monthly data as listed on the following table:
Table 2.
Data for Precautionary and Involuntary Excess Liquidity Estimation
Variable Source of Data
Excess Liquidity
Third Party Funds
Reserve Requirement
Coefficient of variation of Cash to deposit
ratio (volatility risk)
Coefficient of variation of output from trend
Penalty rate
Output Gap (proxy for demand for Cash)
Monetary Survey - Volume of SBI which own by banks
Monetary Survey
CEIC
Moving average from standard deviation of cash ratio to
Deposit (5 month). Cash and Deposit datawere from
monetary survey
Moving average from standard deviation of output gap
(5 month)
Interest rate PUAB o/n (CEIC)
Outputis represented with Industrial Production (CEIC).
Potential output is estimated using HP Filter.
After estimatingprecautionary excess reserve using Equation (13), we proceed to estimating
involuntary excess reserve. In this step, we subtract the actual independent variables in Equation
(13), which were the proxy for total excess liquidity owned by banks, with the estimated one
from Equation (13). In the other words, involuntary excess reserve is estimated with residual
from Equation (13) estimation.
3.2. The Impact of Involuntary Excess Reserve on Monetary Policy
Transmission
On this step, we test the hypothesis; that the presence of high involuntary excess reserve
in banking may weaken the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Following Saxegaard
(2006), we use estimated involuntary excess reserve from the first step as a threshold variable in
analyzing VAR model, which represent the transmission of monetary policy in Indonesia. In this
stage, we allow the possibility for non-linearity in monetary policy transmission caused by
deviation of involuntary excess liquidity relative to certain threshold.
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Where      and    are shock vectors that are not regime dependent, representing non-
policy and policy variable respectively;   is regime-dependent matrix of polynomial lag
from autoregressive parameter;      is threshold variable(involuntary excess reserve), which
determine the current regime, relative to certain threshold ( τ ).
As in Bernanke and Milhov (1995), the dependent variables are divided into two groupin
reduced form VAR; non-policy variable such as GDP and inflation, and policy variable including
nominal exchange rate and BI rate policy. The data we useon this step is explained in Table 3.
All variables are transformed into natural logarithm and are de-trended using HP Filter.
(15)
We estimate the reduced form two-regime TVAR below:
Table 3.
Data for ThresholdVAR Estimation
Variable Source of Data
Involuntary Excess liquidity
Output
Inflation (yoy)
Exchange rate
BI rate
Estimated from step 1
Industrial production (CEIC)
Source: DSM
Source: CEIC
Source: DSM
In estimating this reduced form VAR, we apply MSVAR software (Krolzig-1998). The
existence of non-linearity in monetary policy transmission mechanism will formally be tested
using this program. Furthermore, regime-dependent impulse response will be used to analyze
the difference of economics response towards monetary policy shock between the 2 regimes.
Christiano and Echenbaum (1996) argue that one cannot identify the impact of monetary
policy shock directly using the reduced form two-regime TVAR model in Equation (14), since
the covariance matrix of residual vector is not diagonal. This is because the monetary policy
depends on economic condition;hence response of the economic variable reflects the
combination effect between monetary policy and other variables which also changethe monetary
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policy. To solve this problem, we need to implement restriction in TVAR model. This restriction
is obtained by searching matrix A,which fulfill the following conditions:
For    is error vector with diagonal covariance matrix   .
We need to identify the influence of policy variable shock (policy interest rate), which
is not anticipated by other endogenous variable. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) argue that to
identify the impact of policy monetary shock without identifyingthe complete model structure,
we can assume the policy variable react contemporaneouslyon non-policy variable, but not the
other way around. Following this, we use the following restriction:
(16)
for i = 1,2 or
for i = 1,2
(17)
IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
Following the steps explained before, we estimate the precautionary and involuntary
excess liquidity, and measure the threshold using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method
in MSVAR (Krozlig-1998). This threshold will be our benchmark to classify the excess liquidity
regime;the low or the highregime. On the impact of excess liquidity towards monetary policy
transmission, we compare the impulse response function of macro variable, between the low
and high EL regime.
Firstly we test for the EL persistence, using simple regression model, with the following
results:
E L 
t
   = 0.99 EL
t-1 + ε
(0.01) ***
R2  =  0.70
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Since the coefficient of excess of liquidity variable in t-1 is close to 1, we conclude the
excess of liquidity during the observation period is persistent.
4.1. Precautionary and Involuntary Excess Liquidity Estimation
Following Henry et.al. (2010) and theoretical model of Agenor et.al. (2000), our estimation
result for excess liquidity determinant is:
Table 4.
Excess of Liquidity Determinant Estimation Result
Dependent Variabel: Log(EL)
Variabel Koefisien
Intercept - 0.438***(0.113776)
Log(EL(-1)) 0.864***(0.070112)
Volatility_CD(-3) 1.546**(0.672642)
Rate_PUAB(-4) 0.007*(0.004533)
Volatility_IPGap(-4) 0.002***(0.000461)
R-Squared 0.74
Prob (F-Statistic) 0.000
Note:
t-Statistic in parentheses.
Level significancy: *** on 1%; ** on 5% ; * on 10%.
Several alternative variable proposed by Henry et.al (2010) including reserve requirement,
is not significant for Indonesiancase.Referring to the best estimation result above, all variable
(lag EL, cash deposit volatility, PUAB interest rate, and gap output volatility) already have correct
signs and statistically significant.
Next, we use the estimation result above to calculate the precautionary excess liquidity,
which is needed by banking industry. Following Henry et.al (2010), involuntary EL is calculated
as:Involuntary EL = EL Total - ELPrecautionary. The result is presented at Figure 2.
We use this estimated involuntary EL as threshold variable to split the regime in Threshold
√ Vector Auto Regression (T-VAR) method, using MS-VAR module (Krolzig, 1998) in OxMetrics
application.
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4.2.  Excess Liquidity Threshold and Regime Classification
T-VAR estimation refers to Saxegaard (2006) and Bernanke and Blinder (1992), using 4
endogenous variables; namely Production Index (GDP proxy), Inflation, Exchange Rate, and BI
Rate. Production Index and Inflation variable are non-policy variable, while Exchange Rate and
Figure 2.
Excess Liquidity: Precautionary vs. Involuntary
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Figure 3.
Involuntary Excess Liquidity Regime: Low vs. High
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Table 5.
Estimated Threshold Value with MLE Method
Estimated Threshold
LR Test
p-values (adjusted χ2)
0.00048870
Low         2001:08 - 2005:9
High        2005:10 - 2010:9
237.7847
[0.0000]
Rezim Classification
BI Rate variable are policy variable. Again, policy variable react contemporaneously on non-
policy variable, but not the other way around. In addition, we adjustthe S-VAR structure by
including NFA variable as exogenous variable, to suit the condition for Indonesia.NFA is also
policy variable, and potentially affects the exchange rate and inflation.
The result of T-VAR estimation is presented below. Complete result is provided in
Appendix A.
We try several lag alternatives (from lag 0 to 8) for the threshold variable (EL variable),
and found lag 2to be the best choice because it provide more intuitive result. In addition, it
suits the economic condition break in 2005 due to inflation hike, a high BI rate, and reserve
requirement policy.
During the period from October 2001 - September 2009, we found two excess liquidity
regime; low EL Regime for August 2001-September 2005, and high EL Regime for October
2005√September 2010. Using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) in MS-VAR module, the
estimated threshold is:
The Likelihood Ratio (LR) above is important to test the linearity of EL threshold within
the sample range 2001:8 to 2010:9. According to that result, high LR coefficient value (237.7847)
and p-values (below 5%) confirms nonlinearity on EL, hence support our EL regime classification.
4.3. The Impact of Excess Liquidity on Monetary Policy
We use policy rate as the proxy for monetary policy and analyze its effectiveness toward
other macro variables such as production index (GDP proxy), inflation and exchange rate. On
VAR structure, we evaluate the monetary policy transmission by giving one standard deviation
shock (impulse) on BI rate, then compare its impact on the two classified regime. The result is
presented below.
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Figure 4.
IRF Monetary Policy Transmission: High vs. Low  Involuntary Excess Liquidity
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According to impulse-response function above, the increase in BI rate will be transmitted
into three macro variables as follow:
a) Towards Index of Production (GDP proxy)
For low and high EL regime, an increase of BI rate by one standard deviation will lower the
GDP as expected and is compatible with theory. Though slightly differ, a tight monetary
policy will lower Indonesia economic growth, both in low and high excess liquidity regime.
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b) Towards Inflation
During low EL regime (left picture), an increase of BI rate will reduce the inflation pressure,
which is in line with Inflation Targeting Framework (ITF). Though it needs few lags for the
inflation to response the policy rate, the interest-based policy performs fairly well on this
regime. Nevertheless, we do not find condition during high EL regime (right picture).
Interestingly, when economic is in high excess liquidity, the monetary policy transmission is
not effective to restrains inflation. In fact, in high EL regime, an increase of BI rate is responded
with an increase of inflation.
One possible explanation is that over accelerated economic needs to be responded with an
increase of BI rate, which reduce the fund on market. However, in high excess liquidity
regime, the public fund remains largely available; hence the demand will be relatively higher
compared to low EL regime.
This positive relationship between BI rate and inflation require further research. As for current
paper, we only focus on comparison between the two regimes, and conclude that the high
excess liquidity in economics will lower the effectiveness of BI rate to control inflation.
c) Towards exchange rate
In line with the uncovered interest parity (UIP) theory, the increase of BI rate will raise the
value of IDR. An increase of domestic interest rate will make domestic more attractive,
therefore increase the demand for IDR. This result applies for both low and high EL regime.
The analysis of impulse response function above is based on SVAR structure with the
following endogenous variables: Index of Production, Inflation, Exchange rate, BI rate, and NFA
(Net Foreign Assets). As additional analysis and comparison, we specify two alternatives of
SVAR structure namely alternative A which only include Index of Production, Inflation, Exchange
rate, and BI rate variables, and exclude NFA. However the result of this pure structure from
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), give inconclusive result and does not consistent with the theory.
Alternative B, we use Non-Performing Loan (NPL) variable to capture the constraint on loan
supply. Likewise, this alternative also does not provide conclusive result. We report the complete
result for both alternatives on appendix.
In general, we have shown that excess liquidity affect the effectiveness of monetary
policy. In high EL regime condition, the impact of BI rate as a monetary policy instrument in
order to reach the monetary policy objective (which is low and stable inflation), is relatively
lower than in low EL regime. Therefore, several initiative programs of Bank Indonesia related to
controlling and managingliquidity are necessary and require further improvement.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper gives several important conclusions. First, the behavior of bank to keep excess
liquidity for precautionary is affected significantly by the volatility of cash demand, the volatility
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of economic growth, the cost of fund for bank, and the liquidity condition in previous period.
Second, the application of Threshold-VAR (TVAR) method shows that there are two regimes
of excess liquidity in Indonesia; the Low EL Regime (2001:08 √ 2005:9) and√the High EL Regime
(2005:10 √ 2010:9). The regime switch occurred in 2005, when there were significant changes
in Indonesia economics condition including the increases of inflation, BI Rate, higher open
market operation, policy changeon minimum reserve requirement, and also the rise of foreign
reserve accumulation in Bank Indonesia.
The policy implication is straightforward. Bank Indonesia needs to control and to direct
the high excess liquidity condition. Further endorsement on several existing programs is necessary,
including the conversion of SUP (Surat Utang Pemerintah) to be tradable, Treasure Single Account
(TSA) with Asset Liability Management (ALM), and the use of SPN (Surat Perbendaharaan Negara)
as monetary instrument.
This paper calls for further research, especially related to structure of SVAR, which only
consists of 4-5 variables.The model proposed by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) may be appropriate
for developed countries because of the stability of their institutional economics. On the other
hand, Indonesia is a transition country, where the policy is often adjusted to economic situation
and sometimes to the political situation. Therefore, future study should account for this issue,
using the T-VAR method.
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APPENDIX A.
ESTIMATION RESULT OF T-VAR MODEL (LAG 2)
LogLikelihood and estimated threshold for given number of regimes
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Correlogram : Standard resids
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APPENDIX B. IRF SVAR
IRF ALTERNATIVE A:
SVAR WITHOUT NFA
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ALTERNATIVE B:
SVAR WITH REPLACING NFA FOR NPL
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